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Recently, as a result of the football diplomacy between Armenia and Turkey, an opinion poll was 
conducted in both Turkey and Armenia to gauge the reaction to new gestures in the Turko-Armenian 
relationship. The poll was carried out by MetroPoll in Ankara (Turkish only website) and by the 
Armenian Center for National and International Studies -- run by Rafik Hovannisian an American 
Diaspora Armenian now resident in Yerevan and involved in Armenian politics. 
 
Unfortunately, the original questions asked or the sample size are not available online. However, the 
findings are indicative of the opinions of countries that are winners and losers (Turkey -- winner, 
Armenia -- loser). 
 
In Turkey, almost 70 percent of the population found the Turkish president Abdullah Gül's trip was 
successful and presumably supported the normalization of relations with Armenia. What would have 
been more interesting to ask, however, was Turks view of the importance of normalizing relations 
with Armenia. I would hypothesize that the majority of Turks, particularly those who live far from 
Eastern Anatolia do not see the current position as hurting their economic interests and do not see 
the issue as vital -- particularly if it would require any change of Turkey's stance on the genocide 
issue. With Armenia's limited purchasing power, Turkey stands little to gain economically from 
opening its border. Furthermore, Turkey already export to Armenia through Georgia, and it is 
presumably Armenia that pays the higher costs for goods, not Turkey. 
 
Interest in Armenia may be more pronounced for those Turks who live in Kars and other settlements 
bordering Armenia. However, while these places stand to gain most from cross-border trade, they 
also may have much stronger feelings about how the opening of the border may affect their lives and 
have potential worries about attempts of Armenians to reclaim or purchase property in the area. 
 
Given the deep and continuing melancholy that permeates much of Armenian society's 
consciousness as a result of the slaughter and expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Armenians 
from Eastern Turkey and the central role that genocide plays in Armenian political culture, the 
Armenians show much more skepticism towards normalized relations with Turkey -- though the 
news is not all bad. Only 11 percent of respondents said they were against all cooperation with 
Turkey -- albeit 76 percent were only willing to normalize relations after certain preconditions were 
met. Ostensibly, preconditions revolve around the recognition of the Armenian genocide. 
 
However, we would expect that more thorough plumbing of Armenian citizens' perceptions may 
reveal a more nuanced understanding of the policy trade-offs involved in preconditions. Likely, 
many more Armenians may be willing to engage in some compromise, if it meant more sustainable 
economic growth. Unlike Turkey, Armenia stands to reap large economic benefits from the opening 
of the border with Turkey. Transport costs would drop significantly for the many Turkish products 
that already wend their way through Georgia to Armenia; moreover, Armenia would have a more 
ready export market for finished goods they produce -- particularly if the Caucasian Tiger becomes 
more of a reality than a simulacrum. 
 
Whatever the future for relations between Turkey and Armenia may hold, it is important to continue 
to provide open and reliable data on the process. 
